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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Petitioner,

Case No. 940179-CA

v.
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD and
MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,

:

Priority No. 14

Respondents.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Career Service
Review Board ("CSRB" or "Board") affirming the decision of its
hearing

officer

employment

which

reversed

grievant's

by the Utah Department

"Department").

termination

of Corrections

from

("UDC" or

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1993). Relief is
appropriate under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (b) , (d) # and
(h) (iv) (1989) .
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.
holding

Did the Career Service Review Board misapply the law in
that a finding of unlawful

conduct

in violation of

Department policy requires a criminal conviction?
Agency decisions regarding questions of general law are
reviewed for correctness.

Utah Dep't of Corrections v. Despain.

824 P.2d 439, 443 n.8 (Utah App. 1991).
This issue did not arise until the Board held at step 6 that

a policy violation requires a criminal conviction. It is therefore
appropriately raised for the first time on appeal.
2.

Did the Career Service Review Board erroneously fail to

give latitude and deference to the Department of Corrections'
decision to terminate grievant from Department employment?
An agency decision based on interpretation or construction of
general law is reviewed without deference for correctness. Id. An
agency's

application

of

its

own

rules

is

reviewed

for

reasonableness and rationality under an intermediate standard "of
some, but not total, deference." Kent v. Dep't of Employment S e c .
860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1993).
This issue was preserved for appeal at the step 5 level at R.
371-77 and 1112-20, and in the Department's step 6 brief at R. 44.
3.

Did the Career Service Review Board erroneously hold the

Department's sanction of termination unreasonable?
The CSRB's decision to affirm or reverse a termination
decision is a question of applying its rules to the facts and is
reviewed for reasonableness and rationality under an intermediate
standard giving some, but not total, deference. Id.
This issue was preserved for appeal in the Department's step
6 brief at R. 58-59.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before the Court is
contained in the body of this brief.
2

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
After an interdepartmental hearing process, the Department of
Corrections in May, 1991 terminated the public employment of
Michael Dean Hummel, a security and enforcement officer.

This

sanction was for Hummel's violation of three separate departmental
policies.

The three violations were based on:

Hummel's criminal

physical abuse of his young daughter, which he admitted in the
course of his prosecution and eventual guilty plea; his failure to
report the criminal charge and prosecution to his Department
supervisors; and his belligerent and disrespectful conduct before
the criminal sentencing judge.
In its February 23, 1994 decision on administrative appeal of
the disciplinary action, the Career Service Review Board threw out
the first policy violation because, in the interim, the plea-based
criminal

conviction had been set aside in a post-conviction

proceeding. The Board reasoned there could be no unlawful conduct
in violation
conviction

of Department

in place.

policy

without

The Board discarded

a valid

criminal

the third policy

violation, accepting its hearing officer's finding that the taped
interchange between Hummel and the criminal sentencing judge did
not

demonstrate

Department.

that

Hummel

had

brought

discredit

upon

the

Finally, the Board concluded that the sanction of

termination for the one remaining policy violation, failure to
notify the Department of the criminal prosecution for child abuse,
was unreasonable.

The Board ordered Hummel reinstated with back

pay.

3

The Department of Corrections then brought this petition under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) for judicial review of the Board's
final action.

pT&TTgMTgi^r Q F FACTS

Grievant

Michael

Dean Hummel

began

employment

with

the

Department of Corrections in December of 1987 as a security and
enforcement officer.

R. 825-26.

On November 3, 1989, after

learning of his arrest and plea of guilty on a charge of criminally
abusing his minor daughter, the Department served grievant with an
administrative complaint charging three violations of departmental
policy and procedure.

R.266-70.l

Grievant appeared before the

Department's administrative law judge on April 25, 1990, for an
evidentiary

hearing

on

the

disciplinary

charges.

R.

271.

Grievant's attorney subsequently moved to stay the Department's
disciplinary proceedings pending grievant's efforts to withdraw his
plea of guilty to the criminal charge based on his daughter's
recantation.

R. 10 at % 14; R. 273.

The criminal trial court

found the recantation unconvincing and the motion to withdraw plea
untimely,

and

consequently

ruled against

grievant.

R. 835.

Nonetheless, the administrative stay was continued while grievant
appealed the denial of his motion first to this Court, which
affirmed the trial court in November, 1990, and then by petition
l

Grievant was charged with violations of Utah Department of
Corrections Policies and Procedures AE 02/03.37, Unlawful Conduct:
AE 02/02.02, Member Responsibility; and AE 02/03.01, Standard of
Conduct.
Relevant text of these provisions is contained in
Addendum A of the separately bound Addenda.
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for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court, which denied the
petition on March 5, 1991. R. 273; R. 10 at 1 14-15.
On May 10, 1991, the Department's administrative law judge
filed a report and recommendation in the disciplinary action.

R.

271-81 (Addendum B) . He found grievant guilty of unlawful conduct,
due not only to his conviction of class B misdemeanor child abuse,
but also to grievant's admission to striking his daughter and
leaving a bruise on her face.

R. 276. He further found grievant

guilty of failing to report his involvement with the criminal
justice system to a superior officer and of bringing discredit upon
law enforcement and the Department by his disrespectful conduct in
court. R. 276-77. Based on these findings, he recommended a range
of sanctions from a maximum of termination to a minimum of 30 days'
suspension without pay, a reduction in grade, and placement in a
position with no weapon requirement and minimal offender contact.
R. 281.

Grievant appealed the report and recommendation to the

Department's executive director, but was terminated from employment
by Department order dated May 28, 1991. R. 282-83 (Addendum C).
On June 4, 1991, grievant appealed his termination to the
Career Service Review Board.

R. 11 at 1 19.

He subsequently

sought and was granted an indefinite stay of the CSRB proceedings
to pursue a petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to his
criminal conviction.

R. 11 at % 21. The petition was granted by

the district court on January 2, 1992, on grounds that the trial
court

had

accepted

grievant's

plea

in violation

of

certain

procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

5

Procedure.

R. 136-44.

All records relating to the criminal

offense were ordered expunged.

R. 145-47.

On June 3, 1992, the CSRB stay was lifted, and a <£e novo
evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB hearing officer Robert
Thorup on seven dates beginning August 11, 1992, and ending April
12, 1993.

R. 11 at 1 24; R. 95; R. 8; R. 21 at 1 3.

On May 10,

1993, the hearing officer rendered a decision containing his
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

R. 8-26 (Addendum D) .

The hearing officer found substantial evidence that grievant had
violated the Department's policy prohibiting unlawful conduct by
engaging in conduct that constituted class C misdemeanor child
R. 22 at % 8.

abuse.

He also found substantial evidence that

grievant had failed to notify a superior officer of the criminal
charge against him, in violation of Department policy.
1 10.

R. 22 at

He did not find substantial evidence that grievant had

brought

discredit

on

sentencing hearing.

the

Department
% 11.

R. 22 at

by

his

conduct

at

the

He ordered grievant's

reinstatement, with benefits, at one grade lower than the position
grievant occupied at the time of termination.

R. 25.

He also

ordered a lump sum award of back pay with interest, less 30 days'
suspension.

R. 26.

He retained jurisdiction over implementation

of the ordered relief.

R. 26.

On May 20, 1993, the Department

appealed this decision to the Board.

R. 27-28.

After oral argument on appeal, the Board filed its decision
and final agency action on February 23, 1994. R. 91-124 (Addendum
E).

The Board concluded that because grievant's child abuse

6

conviction had been judicially overturned, grievant did not violate
the Department's prohibition against unlawful conduct.
1 19.

It affirmed

grievant's

conduct

Department.

the CSRB hearing
in court

R. 110 and 121.

officer's

did not bring

R. 121 at

finding that

discredit

on the

Agreeing with the hearing officer

that the grievant's failure to report was substantially mitigated,
the Board held that this sole minor, technical violation could not
support termination as a reasonable sanction.
1 16.

R. 109; R. 120 at

The Board ordered grievant reinstated to his last-held

position with benefits and back pay, including all increases as if
continuously employed with satisfactory performance, less 30 days'
suspension for the failure to report and reductions for any posttermination
earnings.

unemployment

compensation

R. 121-23 at 11 1-6.

and

gross

employment

Finally, the Board retained

jurisdiction over disputes between the parties for a 60-day period
beginning on grievant's return to active duty.

R. 123 at 1 7.

The Department appealed this decision to the Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both the Department's administrative law judge and the CSRB
hearing officer found that evidence independent of grievant's
criminal conviction was sufficient to establish grievant's criminal
abuse of his minor daughter.

On review, the Board, contrary to

this Court's express precedent, reversed the finding of the hearing
officer,

holding

that

the

judicial

reversal

of

grievant's

conviction mandated a finding that grievant did not commit unlawful

7

conduct. The conviction had been overturned on a technicality that
did not bear on grievant's misconduct or contradict the evidence
adduced in the Department's termination proceedings.

Given the

independent evidence of grievant's criminal conduct and the failure
of

grievant's

direct

substantive

appeal

from

the

criminal

conviction, the Board misconstrued the law in holding that the
post-termination judicial reversal of grievant's conviction, on
strictly procedural grounds, mooted the administrative charge of
unlawful conduct.
Before terminating grievant's employment, the Department of
Corrections

held

an

evidentiary

hearing

which

established

grievant's violation of three personnel policies by substantial
evidence.

When grievant appealed the Department's action to the

Career Service Review Board, the CSRB hearing officer, rather than
reviewing the Department's findings to assure that the substantial
evidence test was met at the agency level, took evidence anew,
including

evidence

of

events

that

occurred

after

grievant's

termination, and impermissibly substituted his judgment for that of
the Department. The hearing officer's actions failed to recognize
both the Department's disciplinary authority and the CSRB's limited
role.

On review of the hearing officer's decision, the Board

compounded

the error by premising

its review on the hearing

officer's new findings of fact, effectively precluding any review
of Department findings.

These compounded errors divested the

Department of its statutorily vested discretion over employee
discipline subject to only limited review.
8

Under its enabling legislation, the Career Service Review
Board is limited in function to reviewing specified personnel
actions taken by the state's administrative agencies.

Both by

statute and under its own rules, the CSRB determines if the
agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence. However,
the Board's present rule, applied by the Board in the decision
below,

exceeds the CSRB's statutory

function by allowing no

deference to the agency's findings of fact.
empowers

the

Board's

hearing

officer

to

The revised rule
make

an

original

determination of the facts based on a £e novo hearing. Only if the
officer newly finds facts to support the agency's allegations are
the

agency's

sanctions

reviewed

for

excessiveness,

disproportionality, or abuse of discretion, supposedly under a
deferential standard.

This bifurcated procedure goes beyond the

Board's statutory authority.
Under the revised rule, the CSRB exceeds its review function
again at the appellate level.

By rule, the Board permits itself

the discretion to correct the hearing officer's factual findings,
to make new or additional findings, and even to take new evidence.
Its latitude in disposing of the appeal is, by its rule, equally
broad,

encompassing

modification,

but

amendment,

not
and

limited

to

supplementation

full

or

partial

of

the

hearing

officer's decision as well as affirmance and reversal.

This

standard, like the Board's standard at the evidentiary level,
leaves no room for agencies to exercise their discretion in the
discipline of their own employees.

9

Because the Board failed to apply the proper standard of
review in assessing the Department's factual basis for grievant's
termination, and because it misapplied the law in excusing grievant
from culpability for his unlawful conduct, its conclusion that the
sanction

of

termination

was

disproportionate

misconduct is inherently flawed.

to

grievant's

Grievant's termination must be

weighed against the substantial evidence the Department found to
support

its

substituted

disciplinary
findings.

violations--including
termination

from

disproportionate,
discretion.

charges,

In light
his

not

of

admitted

Department
or an abuse

against

grievant's
child

employment
of

was

the

Board's

three policy

abuse--grievant's
not

excessive,

the Department's

statutory

The Board's order directing grievant's reinstatement

must, therefore, be reversed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CSRB'S CONCLUSION THAT THE REVERSAL OF GRIEVANT'S
CRIMINAL CONVICTION ON A TECHNICALITY MOOTS THE PERSONNEL
POLICY VIOLATION OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IS INCORRECT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
By administrative complaint, the Department charged grievant
with three violations of Department policy.
violations,

"[t]he most

serious matter

Of the three charged

in this case is the

conviction for child abuse" (R. 278) that resulted in a charge of
unlawful conduct under Department policy and procedure AE 02/03.37.
At all times relevant to this case, AE 02/03.37 provided:
A.

Any act or conduct that constitutes a
10

B.

wrongful practice as defined by federal,
State or local law is prohibited.
Such prohibited conduct includes, but is
not limited to:
•

C.

In

• •

5.
the conviction of any criminal act.
If a member is under investigation for
unlawful conduct by any law enforcement
agency, the Department shall not be
precluded
from
engaging
in
an
administrative
investigation
and/or
imposing disciplinary sanctions up to and
including discharge.

testimony

before

the

CSRB

hearing

officer,

grievant

acknowledged his responsibility to be familiar with Department
policies and procedures. See R. 969. The policy it was grievant's
duty to know and follow leaves no room to doubt that unlawful
conduct is grounds for termination from Department employment.
Both the Department and the Board had substantial evidence of
grievant's

criminal

conduct

before

them.

The

Department's

administrative law judge found that grievant's own admissions
constituted substantial evidence of his engagement in an act of
child abuse.

Noting that "Mr. Hummel submitted a hand written

statement that says he struck the victim leaving a bruise on her
face"

(R. 272), he concluded that "Mr. Hummel's statement to

Detective Collins that he slapped the victim hard enough to leave
a bruise, in this examiner's view, establishes a violation of
76-5-109, U.C.A."

R. 276.

The CSRB hearing officer likewise found factual predicates to
sustain grievant's violation of law.

Like the Department's

administrative law judge, he took note of grievant's confession to
Detective Collins "that he had struck Saibrina on the side of the

11

face and had left a bruise" (R. 16 at 1 34) and concluded that
"there is substantial evidence to support the Agency's finding that
Grievant did strike Sabrina on one or more occasions in a manner
constituting child abuse as defined in Utah statutes, i.e. striking
Sabrina and leaving a bruise with a mental intent sufficient to
constitute a crime."

R. 17 at 1 48.

At step 6, however, the Board rejected any finding of criminal
conduct by grievant on the ground that
[t]his Board has no jurisdiction over
criminal cases. Therefore, the Board lacks
jurisdiction to assess what criminal offense,
if any, has been committed by an offending
employee. Furthermore, the Board is concerned
only with employee conduct (or misconduct),
not criminal intent or lack thereof. As a
civil service entity, we may only consider
what an employee actually did, not what the
employee may have intended to do.
R.

107.

The

Board

then

concluded

that

because

grievant's

conviction had been reversed and the record expunged, no violation
of the Department's prohibition of unlawful conduct could be shown,
as "[t]he matter of law subsumes the question of evidentiary
proof."

R. 107.

While a criminal conviction is strong evidence of criminal
misconduct, it is not the only evidence, and it is not requisite to
a finding of unlawful conduct under Department policy.

Less than

three years ago, the Department and the Board came before this
Court on the exact issue of unconvicted but unlawful conduct.

In

Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain. 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App.
1991,

Despain,

a

correctional

officer,

was

administratively

charged--under the identical provision charged against Hummel--with
12

unlawful conduct for assaulting his former wife. He was terminated
from Department employment on the basis of the victim's testimony.
In proceedings

before

the

CSRB,

the

Board

agreed

with

the

Department in crediting the victim's testimony but# despite finding
a factual basis for the assault, "concluded that Despain did not
criminally

assault

his

former wife because

'[n]o such legal

charge--much less conviction--was ever officially brought against
him.'w

Despain. 824 P.2d at 444.

This Court soundly repudiated

the Board's analysis and concluded that Despain violated the
Department's unlawful conduct policy under either the Department's
or the CSRB's view of the evidence.

The Court unambiguously held

that "[t]he fact that Despain was not convicted of assault is not
dispositive

because

conviction."

Id.

a

policy

violation

does

not

require

a

In light of the Board's awareness of this

categorical precedent

(see R. 25) # its attempt to distinguish

Despain at step 5 is unconvincing.

The Board's refusal to find

unlawful conduct in the absence of a criminal conviction is plainly
wrong.

Its defiance of the Court's pronouncement

cannot be

brooked.
In addition, the CSRB's statutory role is to review agency
decisions to assure that they are supported by substantial evidence
at the agency level. At the time of the Department's decision to
terminate grievant from employment, grievant had exhausted all
direct appeals from his conviction. The recantation of grievant's
daughter had been found unconvincing, and three courts had affirmed
the conviction.

Without a doubt, the conviction was firmly in

13

place at the time the Department made its termination decision. In
overturning the Department's decision on the basis of subsequent
events, the CSRB overstepped its statutory authority to review the
evidentiary underpinnings of agency decisions.
On June 3, 1992, grievant moved the CSRB to lift the stay on
step 5 proceedings that had been previously granted at his request.
The Board lifted the stay the same day.

See Addendum F.

On June

16, 1992, the Department's attorney filed a motion to remand the
case to the Department for reconsideration in light of the reversal
of grievant's conviction.

See Addendum G.

After grievant filed

objections dated June 23, 1992 (see Addendum H) , the motion was
denied by CSRB Administrator Robert N. White on June 26, 1992. See
Addendum

I.2

Therefore, the Department

was never given the

opportunity to address the new developments in grievant's case. A
remand would have permitted the Department to determine whether
subsequent developments required modification of its prior findings
or actions. By denying the Department this opportunity, the Board
should likewise have been foreclosed from relying on subsequent
events to establish the propriety of the Department's decision.
Even grievant's attorney admitted that
[w]hatever action the Department took in
this case in terms of the discipline that was
imposed of Mr. Hummel, the truth is, they took
that action based on certain facts that they
2

For unknown reasons, the documents contained in Addenda F
through I were not included in the indexed record filed with the
Court by the Career Service Review Board in this case.
The
Department of Corrections, simultaneously with submission of its
opening brief, is filing a motion to supplement the record with
these documents.
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either had or didn't have at the time, and
that that [sic] decision and the propriety of
that decision has to be based on the facts
that they had, not the facts that they didn't
have.
I think it's completely inappropriate now
to come back more than a year after the
decision was made and try to discover facts in
terms of -- and ask for admissions to justify
a decision that was made more than a year
before. I mean, either there was a basis for
the decision that can be legally upheld or
there wasn't, and that has to be based on what
the Department knew at the time.
. . . I mean, the Department either had
a basis for its decision or it didn't, and I
think that's the issue that was outlined in
the prehearing conference brief.
R. 379-80 (emphasis supplied). In objecting to certain Department
discovery requests, grievant's attorney again stated, "They have to
justify their decision based upon what they said their decision was
based on, which did not include any of the information in these
requests for admissions.11

R. 383.

Responding, the CSRB hearing

officer noted that
really, you are going to be hurt tremendously
if we apply a standard that says, was the
Department justified based on what it found
and what were in fact facts at that time.
Your whole case frankly goes to the issue of
what happened after the Agency took its action
and that there has been a change in
circumstances
that
by
definition
is
evidentiary now but was not evidentiary then.
R. 385 (emphasis supplied) . The hearing officer virtually admitted
that, without consideration of subsequent events, grievant had no
case.
Given that grievant stood before the Department as a convicted
criminal, the Department's decision was fully justified by the
facts available to the Department at the time. Given the denial of
15

remand for consideration of post-termination developments, the
Board should not have considered those events in its own decision.
But most important, given this Court's precedent in Despain. the
CSRB committed error in requiring a valid criminal conviction for
a finding of grievant's unlawful conduct.

As in Despain, under

either the Department's or the Board's view of the evidence, the
finding of grievant's unlawful

conduct--an offense which, by

itself, justifies termination under the Department's policy--is
substantially supported and must be upheld.
POINT II
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
LATITUDE AND DEFERENCE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION.
A.

The CSRB changed its administrative rule governing the review
of agency actions during the course of grievant's step 5
hearing.
Grievant appealed the Department's termination order to the

Career Service Review Board on June 4, 1991.
administrative rule governing Step 5 hearings

On that date, the
(the "old rule11)

provided as follows:
An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new
hearing for the record, with both parties
being
accorded
full
administrative
due
process.
The hearing officer shall give
latitude and deference to an agency's prior
decision when the latter is supported by the
findings of fact based on the evidence.
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20.C (1992). Under the old rule, "[i]n all
hearings, the standard
standard.11

of proof

is the substantial

Utah Admin. Code R137-1-17.J

(1992).

evidence

"Substantial

evidence" was defined in Utah Admin. Code R137-1-4

(1992) as

"something more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a
16

preponderance. It is relevant evidence such as a reasonable person
of an unprejudiced and thinking mind would accept as adequate to
support the conclusion drawn from it."
The focus of the old rule was on the agency's findings of
fact; the CSRB hearing officer simply reviewed those findings and
their evidentiary basis to determine if the findings were supported
by more than a trace of evidence that a reasonable person would
find credible.

The hearing officer was not a factfinder but had

the limited role of assuring that some credible evidence underlay
the agency's action.
Grievant's step 5 hearing began on August 11, 1992. On that
date, attorneys for both parties addressed the CSRB's standard of
review.

The Department's attorney noted that he had received

correspondence from the CSRB administrator indicating that the
Board had implemented an emergency change to the rule altering the
standard.

After considerable discussion

(see R. 371-77), the

hearing officer concluded, "And I just want to make it clear that
at least at this point, I understand that I'm going to be applying
a standard of latitude in [sic] deference and that you all will
have a chance to address that issue in writing."

R. 377.

On November 2, 1992, after the step 5 hearing was underway,
the Board implemented a revised rule (the "new rule").

The new

rule established a bifurcated procedure withdrawing all deference
to the Department's findings of fact:
C.
Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing.
An
evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new
hearing for the record, held de novo, with
both parties being granted full administrative
17

process as follows:
1. The CSRB hearing officer shall first
make factual findings based solely on the
evidence presented at the hearing without
deference to any prior factual findings of the
agency. The CSRB hearing officer shall then
determine whether: (a) the factual findings
made from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing
support
with
substantial
evidence
the
allegations made by the agency or the
appointing authority, and (b) the agency has
correctly applied relevant policies, rules,
and statutes.
2.
When the CSRB hearing officer
determines in accordance with the procedures
set forth above that the evidentiary/step 5
factual findings support the allegations of
the agency or the appointing authority, then
the CSRB hearing officer must determine
whether
the
decision,
including
any
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive,
disproportionate, or otherwise constitutes an
abuse of discretion. In making this latter
determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall
give deference to the decision of the agency
or the appointing authority unless the
agency's
penalty
is
determined
to be
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB
hearing
officer
shall
determine
the
appropriate remedy.
Utah Admin. Code R137-20.C (1993) (emphasis supplied).

The new

rule, directly contradicting the former deferential provision,
gives the CSRB hearing officer && novo factfinding authority.
During closing arguments in the step 5 hearing, on April 12,
1993, the standard of review was once again extensively discussed.
See R. 1112-20. The issue of whether the rule's modifications were
substantive or procedural was also addressed but not decided, as
the hearing officer concluded that the new rule did not apply to
the step 5 hearing:
the [new] rule.

"I just want to be clear I am not invalidating

I'm not making any comment to the rule.
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I'm not

commenting on whether it's procedurally [sic] substantive.

I'm

simply making a decision that I'm going to apply the [latitude and
deference] rule as it existed at the time [the case was filed and
docketed with CSRB]."

R. 1120.

In light of this ruling, the

standard of review was not briefed by the parties.
Even though the CSRB hearing officer had held that he would
apply the old rule, the decision he rendered actually employed the
revised standard.

In his conclusions of law, the hearing officer

stated that "[a]t Step 5, a complete reexamination of the facts is
intended by a disinterested Hearing Officer not connected with the
Agency or the career service system."
invoked

a 3& novo standard without

administrative provision:

R. 21 at 1 2.
reference

He then

to a specific

"Applicable rules of the Board and the

statutes governing the Step 5 hearing process require that the
Agency findings of wrongdoing be upheld, after a de novo review of
all the evidence if the agency findings were lawful and supported
by 'substantial evidence'." R. 21 at 1 3. Only in considering the
agency's sanctions did he refer to a standard of latitude and
deference (R. 23: "Even allowing for the latitude and deference to
be given to the Agency's choice of discipline . . . " ) , and he
nonetheless found grievant's termination to be unreasonable and an
abuse of discretion based on his own findings. See R. 23 at 1 14.
On review at step 6# the Board noted the November 2, 1992
effective date of the revised rule (see R, 96) and held, without
further discussion, that it governed both the step 5 and step 6
proceedings.

See R. 118, 11 5 and 6.
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The Board did not address

its retroactive application of the new rule at step 5.
B.

The CSRB's new provisions governing the step 5 hearing are in
excess of its statutory authority.
State agencies are given statutory discretion under Utah Code

Ann. § 67-19-18 to demote or dismiss their employees "to advance
the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a
superior, misfeasance, malfeasance,

or nonfeasance

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (Supp. 1993).

in office."

Subsection (5) of the

statute vests discretion in the head of the Department of Human
Resource Management
disciplinary

("DHRM") or designated

demotions

and

dismissals

representative

subject

to

limited

over
due

process requirements:
(b) The department head or designated
representative
notifies
the
employee
in
writing of the reasons for the dismissal or
demotion.
(c) The employee has no less than five
working days to reply and have the reply
considered by the department head.
(d) The employee has the opportunity to
be heard by the department head or designated
representative.
(e) Following the hearing, the employee
may be dismissed or demoted if the department
head finds adequate cause or reason.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 67-19-18(5)

§ 67-19-7

(Supp.

1993) permits

personnel

functions

to

state

(Supp.

1993).

Utah

Code

Ann.

the DHRM

director

to

delegate

agencies,

except

for

certain

nondelegable duties listed in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8 (Supp. 1993)
and not relevant here. The Department of Corrections, at all times
relevant to this case, has operated pursuant to such a delegation.

In terminating grievant from employment, the Department performed
its

delegated

duties

in

full

compliance

with

the mandates

of

section 67-19-18(5).
The Career Service Review Board is established by Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19a-201 (Supp. 1993).

Its authority is set out in Utah

Code Ann. 67-19a-202, which states, in relevant part:
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final
administrative body to review appeals from
career service employees and agencies of
decisions
about
promotions,
dismissals,
demotions, suspensions, written reprimands,
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules,
issues concerning the equitable administration
of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes
concerning abandonment of position that have
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the
grievance procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to
review or decide any other personnel matters.
. . .

(3)
In
conjunction
with
any
inquiry,
investigation, hearing, or other proceeding,
any member of the board may:
(a) administer oaths;
(b) certify official acts;
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and
other evidence; and
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board
rule.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202

(Supp. 1993).

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that
statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed,
as

far

as

reasonably

possible,

in

a

way

that

harmonizes

statutes while giving effect to each statutory provision.
City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983).

the

Murray

Reading sections

67-19-18 and 67-l9a-202 in harmony, they define a scheme in which,
as

this

Court

has

held,

"the CSRB must
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affirm

the

[agency's]

decision

if

rationality."

it

is within

the bounds

of

reasonableness

and

Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 860 P.2d 984, 987

(Utah App. 1993); see also Despain. 824 P.2d at 443.

A contrary

interpretation, permitting the CSRB to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency by making findings of factfilenovo, flies in the
face of this Court's precedents and renders agencies' statutory
discretion under section 67-19-18 a nullity.
In determining whether the CSRB's rule goes beyond the scope
of its organic statute, the CSRB is entitled to no deference. The
scope of the CSRB's statutory authority is neither an area in which
the legislature has specifically granted discretion to the CSRB nor
an area involving any technical expertise possessed by CSRB.
Rather, it is a question of general law subject to review for
correctness.

As the supreme court held in Savage Industries v.

Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991),
decisions involving statutory interpretation,
issues of basic legislative intent, or
construction of ordinary terms in the organic
statute of an agency involve areas in which an
appellate court is as well suited to decide
the legal questions as the agency. In cases
where the basic question is what does the law
require? the standard is a correction of error
standard.
Therefore, the CSRB's assertion of factfinding authority under the
new rule does not compel a conclusion that the statute warrants it.
The new rule promulgated by the CSRB purports to give the
Board powers beyond its limited role of review and in excess of the
Board's statutory authority.

Use of the new rule's d£ novo

factfinding standard is implicit in the CSRB hearing officer's
22

decision, and the Board's step 6 decision explicitly relies on this
unauthorized power to ignore agency findings, stating that "[tjhe
Department's pretermination hearing is not accorded any deference
under either the UAPA or the Utah Administrative
R137-1-20 C [sic]."

Code (Supp. 1993) ,

R. 117-18. Because the new rule exceeds the

Board's statutory power, it must be struck down as a matter of law,
and the decision predicated on it must likewise fall.
C.

The retroactive application of CSRB's new substantive rule to
crrievant's pending step 5 hearing was erroneous.
Administrative

rules

promulgated

pursuant

authority have the force and effect of law.

to

statutory

See Horton v. Utah

State Retirement Bd. . 842 P.2d 928, 932 n.2

(Utah App. 1992);

Higginson v. Westeraard. 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979).
Therefore, "the same principles of construction that apply to
statutes

apply

to

rules

administrative body."
rules

of

and

regulations

promulgated

Higginson. 842 P.2d at 55.

construction,

"[ejvery

amendment

by

an

Under these

not

expressly

characterized as a clarification carries the rebuttable presumption
that

it

is

liabilities."
1990).

intended

to

change

existing

legal

rights

and

State v. Amador. 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App.

In determining whether changed language applies to accrued

and pending actions, this Court looks to whether the change affects
substantive rights or has only procedural consequences.

See

Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667
(Utah App. 1990) (holding that statutes generally cannot be given
retroactive

effect

unless

retroactive

intent,

but

the

noting
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language
a

expressly

contrary

rule

declares

where

only

procedural changes are involved).
The CSRB's new bifurcated procedure, with its denial of
deference to agency findings, effects a substantive change in the
treatment of an agency's decision.
contains

no

language

to

the

The new rule, because it

contrary,

existing legal rights and liabilities.

presumptively

changes

Moreover, by withdrawing

the deference accorded to an agency's factual findings under the
old rule, the new rule strikes at the heart of the agency's
statutorily vested discretion over discipline of its employees and
alters the substantive criteria for decision.

The change is not

merely procedural, "providing a different mode or form of procedure
for enforcing substantive rights," Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450,
455 (Utah 1983), but explicitly isolates agency findings from the
review it is CSRB's statutory duty to perform.

Because the new

rule alters the agency's substantive rights, it cannot be applied
to actions, like grievant's step 5 hearing, that were accrued and
pending when it became effective. Instead, even if the new rule is
not

beyond

the

CSRB's

statutory

authority,

the

Department's

findings of fact were entitled to a deferential review limited,
under the old rule, to a determination of whether the Department
had any

credible

evidence on which to base

its termination

decision.
The effect of the new rule on the substantive rights of the
parties is easily shown.

By making new findings of fact and

allowing no deference to the agency findings, the CSRB hearing
officer substitutes his judgment for that of the agency as to the
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facts.

If the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach

different results, the hearing officer's findings may deviate from
the agency's findings even though both views may be supported by
substantial evidence of a quantum less than a preponderance.3

The

agency's entitlement to affirmance of its findings under a latitude
and deference standard is therefore diminished by the new rule,
with

the

consequence

that

sanctions

appropriate

to

formerly

sustainable findings may be recast as unreasonable in light of the
newly found facts.

In short, manipulation of the facts under the

new rule can be outcome-determinative--the precise result in this
case.
Because the Board did not make its new rule of decision
explicitly

retroactive, the substantive nature of the change

precludes the application of the new rule to grievant's step 5
hearing and invalidates the Board's decision.

3

The CSRB hearing officer misidentified the Department's burden
of proof at the agency level as a preponderance of the evidence:
"The Agency only needs a preponderance and the Board only needs
substantial evidence." R. 24. However, Department disciplinary
policy and procedure AE 03, as it existed at the time of the
disciplinary action against grievant, explicitly invoked the
substantial evidence standard as the Department's burden of proof.
This standard is reflected in the Department's final order:
There is substantial evidence [Hummel]
stands convicted of child abuse and that he
did not report his involvement in the criminal
justice system as required.
There is
substantial evidence to support the finding
his daughter's recantation is unreliable.
There is substantial evidence to support the
finding Mr. Hummel acted inappropriately
before Judge GRIFFITHS.
R. 283.
The CSRB hearing officer provides no reason for
arbitrarily elevating the Department's internal standard of proof.
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D

*

The CSRB's revised step 6 rule further isolated the
Department's findings from meaningful review, in conflict with
controlling statute.
The new rule implemented by the Board modified not only the

provisions governing step 5 hearings but also the Board's step 6
appellate standards.

Under the old rule,

[t]he board's decisions shall be based upon
the following:
1. The board's appellate decisions shall
be supported by credible substantial evidence,
2.
The board's standards of review
consist of determining:
(a) whether the
hearing officer's evidentiary decision was
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether
that decision is warranted by the facts and
circumstances of the case on appeal; and (c)
whether the hearing officer's findings of fact
and conclusions of law are correct and
accurate based upon the evidence in the
record.
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21.D

(1992).

In conjunction with the

latitude and deference to which an agency's action was entitled at
step 5, these provisions respected the agency's proper role:

the

Board looked not only at the substantial evidence underlying its
hearing

officer's decision, but also at whether

the hearing

officer's decision was warranted by the circumstances of the case.
Surely one relevant circumstance is the deference due by the
hearing officer to an agency's findings that are supported by
substantial

evidence.

circumstance under

The

Board's

the old rule

consideration

served

to guard

of

this

against an

unwarranted substitution of judgment by the CSRB hearing officer
for substantially supported agency findings, where reasonable minds
could differ in interpreting the evidence.
The new rule expanded the Board's step 6 role considerably
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beyond appellate consideration of the record in the light of
relevant circumstances.

It established a three-tiered procedure:

1.
The board shall first make a
determination of whether the factual findings
of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and
rational in accordance with the substantial
evidence standard.
If the board determines
that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing
officer are not reasonable and rational based
on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole,
then the board may, in its discretion, correct
the factual findings, and/or make new or
additional factual findings.
2. Once the board has either determined
that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing
officer are reasonable and rational or has
corrected the factual findings based upon the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the
board must then determine whether the CSRB
hearing officer has correctly applied the
relevant policies, rules, and statutes in
accordance with the correctness standard, with
no
deference
being
granted
to
the
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB
hearing officer.
3.
Finally, the board must determine
whether the decision of the CSRB hearing
officer, including the totality of the
sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable
and rational based upon the ultimate factual
findings and correct application of relevant
policies, rules, and statutes determined in
accordance with the above provisions.
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21.D (1993).

These provisions go beyond

review of the decision below to allow still another level of
factfinding and substitution of judgment.

By focusing on the

propriety of the CSRB hearing officer's jig novo findings, the new
step 6 provisions completely eliminate scrutiny of the original
findings made by the agency.

The combined result of the new step

5 and step 6 standards is to prevent an agency from any effective
exercise of its statutory discretion, in direct violation of Utah

27

Code Ann. § 67-19-18

(Supp. 1993) .

Like the revised step 5

provisions, the step 6 modifications cannot stand because the
result of their application conflicts with the Board's limited
statutory power.

Their invalidity leaves the Board's decision

without a legal base.
E*

Neither the CSRB hearing officer nor the Board gave latitude
and deference to the Department's findings of fact in
accordance with the substantial evidence standard.
The Board, in its step 6 decision, explicitly disclaimed any

measure of deference to the Department's factual findings at either
step 5 or step 6.

See R. 117-18 at 11 3 and 5. However, the CSRB

hearing officer assured the parties at step 5 that he would apply
the old rule's latitude and deference standard.
Even taking the CSRB hearing officer's assurances at face
value, his decision evidences use of a non-deferential standard.
His conclusions of law state specifically that "[a]t step 5, a
complete reexamination of the facts is intended by a disinterested
Hearing Officer not connected with the Agency or the career service
system."

R. 21 at 1 2.

An examination of the hearing officer's

findings confirms his lack of deference.
1.

The Unlawful Conduct

In his decision, the CSRB hearing officer first makes findings
of fact as to the Department's allegations of grievant's unlawful
conduct.

See

R.

13-17.

He

notes

that

the

Department's

"Administrative Law Judge found that Sabrina's recantation was not
credible," R, 17 at 1 44, but makes his own finding as to Sabrina's
credibility rather than examining whether the administrative law
28

judge's finding was supported by substantial evidence:

"The

Hearing Officer concludes that Sabrina is inherently incredible and
untrustworthy . . .". R. 17 at 1 47 (emphasis supplied). At only
one point in his discussion of the child abuse allegation does the
CSRB hearing officer refer to what he specifically identifies as an
agency finding:

"There is not substantial evidence to support the

finding of the Agency that Grievant struck Sabrina or any of his
children with either his service belt or a clip from his service
weapon."
contained

R. 17 at 1 50.
exclusively

in

However, the Department's findings are
two

documents:

the

report

and

recommendation of the Department's administrative law judge (R.
271-81) , in which the findings are made# and the Department's final
order (R. 282), which refers to those findings.

Neither document

contains any finding relative to the use of a service belt or clip
by grievant

to strike his children.

To represent

that the

Department made such a finding seriously misstates the facts.
In his conclusions of law, the CSRB hearing officer held as
follows regarding grievant's criminal conduct:
While there is no factual basis to support the
Agency's finding that "Mr. Hummel stands
convicted,
based on his guilty plea, of Child
Abuse, a Class B misdemeanor", there is
substantial evidence that Grievant did in fact
violate Section 76-5-109 (3) (C), Utah Code
Annotated, under conditions that would make
him guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, "child
abuse". This is a violation of AE 02.03.37
A(5), although a significantly less serious
one that [sic] the Class B misdemeanor that
was the basis for the Agency's decision.
R. 22 at 1 8 (emphasis in original).

The only difference between

the class B and class C offenses is in the culpable mental state:
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a class B offense is done with recklessness, while a class C
offense requires only criminal negligence. Grievant pleaded guilty
to and was convicted of a class B offense, which incorporates the
recklessness mens rea. The reversal of his conviction on unrelated
technical

grounds

does

not

disprove

that

he

acted

with

recklessness, and the CSRB hearing officer fails to show that the
Department did not have substantial evidence to support a finding
that grievant's conduct constituted a class B offense.

Instead,

the

criminal

hearing

officer

attempts

to

reduce

grievant's

culpability by drawing distinctions not founded in the law:
In an effort to deprive true child
abusers of any loopholes in the event of
prosecution, and based on an implicit and
relatively recent Legislative policy decision
that, essentially, corporal punishment is to
be discouraged, the Utah statutes defining the
crime of "child abuse" are broadly drafted,
and suffer the anomaly that a parent can
strike one child very hard and not cause a
bruise, and be free of criminal charges; but
let the same parent strike another child with
the same force and cause a bruise, based on
the physiology of the child, and criminal
liability ensues. This draconian legal scheme
requires prosecutors, judges, and juries, as
well as the Agency, to exercise empathy and
discretion in the face of the great change in
attitude that is being caused in society
between the prior generation and the current
one on the issue of corporal punishment by a
parent in order to make just judgments and
punish true abusers while admonishing those
who
are
simply
loving
but
corporal
disciplinarians. At the end of this case, I
have to conclude that while he violated the
law by means of a class C misdemeanor, as
found by substantial evidence, Grievant is not
a malevolent child abuser, and should be
treated
with
a
greater
measure
of
understanding and compassion than the Agency
or Judge Griffiths is willing to bestow.
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R. 24.
The compassion the hearing officer chooses to bestow upon
grievant

is not

supported

by

thorough

analysis.

"Criminal

negligence" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1990) as
acting "with respect to circumstances surrounding

[the actor's]

conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur" (emphasis supplied)•
person acts recklessly

By contrast, a

"when he is aware of but consciously

disregards" the same substantial and

unjustifiable risk.

Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1990) (emphasis supplied).

Utah

The hearing

officer explicitly found that "there is substantial evidence to
support a finding that on at least one occasion, and probably
others, Grievant did strike Sabrina with sufficient force to cause
some minor bruising in an effort to discipline Sabrina for her
apparent violations of the Hummel family's code of proper conduct."
R. 17 at 1 49. Given this finding of probable repeated injury, the
hearing officer's implicit conclusion that grievant was unaware of
the risk that his actions would cause physical injury to his
daughter is unwarranted.

Moreover, grievant's law enforcement

background and former duties make him intimately familiar with the
use of force and its results.

This familiarity, added to the

acknowledged probability that the incident of abuse was only one
event in a course of similar conduct, show the finding of the
Department's administrative law judge that grievant had committed
criminal conduct constituting a class B misdemeanor to be supported
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by substantial evidence and therefore entitled to affirmance at the
step 5 and step 6 levels.
2.

Discredit to the Agency

The CSRB hearing officer's second specific reference to an
agency finding comes in his discussion of grievant's conduct at the
sentencing hearing after his child abuse plea. The hearing officer
first passes judgment on the sentencing judge and then finds that
the judge's words excuse grievant's own conduct:
No unbiased member of the public could listen
to Judge Griffiths' diatribe and not be
embarrassed at his lack of control or decorum.
No unbiased member of the public can listen to
grievant's comments and conclude that, under
the circumstances and given their tone and
context, they brought discredit upon the
Agency.
R. 20 at 1 80.4

Again, rather than focusing on the specific

evidence cited by the Department's administrative law judge to
support

a

finding

that

grievant's

in-court

conduct

brought

discredit upon the Department (see R. 275), the hearing officer

4

Both the CSRB hearing officer and the Department's
administrative law judge reviewed a tape recording of the
sentencing hearing in reaching their respective decisions. See R.
20 and 277. The CSRB hearing officer specifically relied on "the
tone of the comments being made" (R. 20 at 1 80) at the hearing, a
quality that is not ascertainable from the sentencing transcript of
record in this case. It is clear from the record that the actual
tape was in the hands of the CSRB hearing officer at one time (see
R. 722-28) , but it is not clear how the tape was handled after that
point. The tape has apparently not been included by the Career
Service Review Board as a part of the record. While the record
index prepared by the Board contains an entry for "Agency Exh.
21 - Sentencing," it refers only to R. 301-22, a transcript of the
sentencing proceeding.
The Department, simultaneously with
submission of its opening brief, is filing a motion to supplement
the record with the tape recording and numerous other missing
items.
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made

entirely

independent

findings

on

which

he

based

his

conclusion:
The Hearing Officer heard the audio tape of
the sentencing proceedings before Judge
Griffiths and was able to judge the tone of
the comments being made by both Judge
Griffiths and by Grievant, and has reviewed
the manner in which Judge Griffiths deprived
Grievant of his Constitutional rights to due
process of law.
Id.

It was on his independent judgment of this evidence that the

hearing officer entered his finding that "[slubstantial evidence
does not support the Agency's factual conclusion that Grievant
acted in a way to bring discredit to the Agency at the sentencing
hearing."

Id.

He made no mention of other factors considered by

the Department's administrative law judge:

the fact that Judge

Griffiths possessed a copy of grievant's presentence investigation
report (see R. 275 and 190-206) and the fact that grievant was
identified in open court as a corrections officer (see R. 275 and
316) .

Much of what Judge Griffiths said in the course of the

sentencing hearing (R. 301-22) reflects information contained in
the presentence investigation report, and Judge Griffiths' remarks,
as well as grievant's, should be placed in the context of his
apparent reliance on it.
Moreover, the issue of grievant's discreditable conduct was
addressed at the step 5 hearing by only two witnesses:
Rowley,

the

probation

officer

who

prepared

the

Gwen

presentence

investigation report and was present at the sentencing hearing, and
Grievant

himself.

Ms. Rowley

argumentative with the judge.

testified

R.538.
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that

grievant

was

A memorandum she prepared

detailing grievant's in-court conduct (R. 233-35) was admitted into
evidence without objection.

R. 539.

In it, Ms. Rowley notes

grievant's repeated denials of abusive conduct toward his children
and assertions to the judge of power over his own household.

The

memo further states that "while Judge Griffiths was speaking, Mr.
Hummel constantly tried to interrupt and argue with the judge.11 R.
234.

Ms. Rowley's perceptions are borne out by the transcript of

the sentencing hearing.

See R. 301-22 generally, and especially

314-15.
Even Grievant himself admitted that his remarks were illconsidered and could be deemed sarcastic.
reveals

the

following

exchange

The step 5 transcript

between

grievant

and

the

Department's counsel:
Q. You said that yesterday, during your
testimony, you didn't feel that your comment
excuse me.
We don't have the court
reporter here that was here yesterday so I
can't read it back to you, but regarding your
comment, "I appreciate your confidence," you
said "I didn't intend to be sarcastic"; was
that your statement yesterday?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you intend by it?
A.
Well, as I testified yesterday, I
don't really know. Like I said, I was upset.
It wasn't a thought process prior to saying
it. It was kind of a situation as to where I
wasn't allowed to say a lot, and anything I
would have said I felt was a waste, so that
was the last comment.
Q. Well, whether or not you intended it
to be sarcastic, it was sarcastic from our
point.
A.
It could be viewed as such.
I
believe it could be viewed a different way,
also.
R. 967-68.

In response to his own counsel's question, "Did you
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just kind of lose it or what?" (R. 864), grievant had previously
responded, "I did" (id.).
was out of control.

By grievant's own representations, he

In light of the sentencing transcript, Ms.

Rowley's unrefuted observations, and grievant's own admissions, the
CSRB hearing officer's finding that no unbiased person could find
that grievant's

comments brought discredit

on the Department

strains belief.
Of particular interest is the hearing officer's reliance on
grievant's representation that he would not have made the sarcastic
comment

"but

for his

distraught

mental

and

emotional

state

resulting from being falsely accused and publicly humiliated as a
child abuser by the Judge, and his emotional distress over his
mother's death."

R. 20 at 1 79.

The hearing officer found that

"there is substantial evidence that Grievant did in fact violate
Section 76-5-109(3)(c), Utah Code Annotated, under conditions that
would make him guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, 'child abuse'." R.
22 at 1 8. The hearing officer's finding that grievant had abused
his child is entirely inconsistent with his reliance on grievant's
distress over allegedly false accusations of child abuse.
Given the evidence before the CSRB hearing officer, his
finding that grievant's conduct did not bring disrespect the
Department does not withstand scrutiny even under the ££ novo
standard the hearing officer incorrectly applied. Under the proper
latitude and deference standard, the finding simply cannot be
sustained.
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3.

Failure to Report

The CSRB hearing officer concluded that substantial evidence
supported a finding that grievant violated Department policy by
failing to report the charges against him to the Department in
writing.

As

administrative

with

his

findings

regarding

the

other

two

charges, the hearing officer drew his finding

exclusively from the evidence before him at the step 5 hearing,
entirely disregarding the deference due to the Department findings
on this issue.

He then found "substantial evidence of mitigating

circumstances, rather than aggravating circumstances, as found by
the Agency, surrounding this infraction of the Agency's rules." R.
21 at 1 86. He did not identify specific aggravating circumstances
that he found to be unsupported by substantial evidence.
Probation Officer Gwen Rowley testified before both the
Department's

administrative

law judge and the CSRB's hearing

officer. At the step 5 hearing, she stated that grievant "told me
he had no intention of notifying his supervisor" (R. 507) .

She

also testified that when she advised him that Department policy and
procedure required him to notify his supervisor of the criminal
action against him, he responded, "'I don't care about policies and
procedure.'"

R. 515. This testimony was unrebutted.

Grievant testified to knowing his obligation to be familiar
with the Department's policies and procedures.

See R. 969.

He

also acknowledged that Ms. Rowley specifically apprised him of his
obligation to notify his supervisors and he admitted failing to
personally notify any of his supervisors at any time. See R. 970.
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Given that grievant had constructive notice of the reporting
requirement through Department policy and procedure as well as
actual knowledge through his conversation with Ms. Rowley, there is
no doubt that grievant#s violation of this policy provision was
knowing and willful.
While

the

CSRB

hearing

officer

does

not

list

specific

mitigating circumstances, he notes that grievant was informed that
a Department superior had already been advised of the criminal
charges (see R. 20 at 1 81) , that grievant feared his criminal
conduct would become the subject of Department gossip (see R. 20-21
at % 83), and that grievant#s statements to Ms. Rowley "were
expressed under the stress of the moment."

R. 21 at 1 84. These

circumstances, however, do not compel a conclusion of mitigation.
It is naive at best to believe that an agency superior with
knowledge of grievant's criminal conduct would not share that
information with grievant's supervisors; in fact, the hearing
officer explicitly found that "Grievant assumed that Mr. Egan would
advise all other necessary Agency personnel."

R. 20 at 1 82.

Given that grievant presumed the information would be passed to his
supervisors, his concern over potential gossip is specious.

In

fact, providing a written notification as required by policy would
have given grievant an opportunity to assure that the information
reaching the Department was accurate and to guard against unfounded
gossip.
As

to

conduct--the

grievant's
very

stress,

circumstance
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anyone
that

accused

triggers

of
the

criminal
reporting

requirement--is likely to experience a degree of stress due to the
potential of an adverse outcome. This fact simply does not justify
a knowing and willful decision to violate policy.

Grievant's

testimony suggests the actual reason for his distress. In response
to his attorney's question regarding his reluctance to report the
criminal charge, he stated, "This was embarrassing for me. I take
great pride in being a police officer and this was an embarrassing
thing."

R. 866-67.

Grievant's injured pride and embarrassment

over his voluntary conduct is no reason to excuse his recalcitrance
and to minimize his culpability.

Even based solely on the step 5

record, grievant's willful failure to notify his superiors is
supported by substantial evidence, and the Department's finding on
this

point

must

therefore

be

sustained

without

unwarranted

mitigation.
POINT III
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD ERRED IN HOLDING THE
DEPARTMENT'S SANCTION OF TERMINATION UNREASONABLE.
In reviewing the Department's decision to terminate grievant's
employment, both the CSRB hearing officer and the Board concluded
that the Department's sanction was excessive for the infractions
they found that grievant had committed. At both step 5 and step 6,
the relevant authorities therefore ordered grievant's reinstatement
and

substituted

termination.
the

minor

sanctions

for

the

Department-ordered

However, because they improperly failed to sustain

Department's

factual

findings,

their

assessment

propriety of termination is inherently flawed.
At step 6,
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of

the

[t]he Board, as a matter of law, concludes
that the Step 5 hearing officer/presiding
officer's factual findings are both reasonable
and
rational
as
based
upon
the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole as
required by Utah Administrative
Code (Supp.
1993), R137-1-21 D. l. More specifically, the
hearing officer determined that Mr. Hummel's
dismissal by the Department was not based upon
the "just cause" standard because two of the
agency's allegations are unsupported by the
evidence (AE 02/03.37 A(5) [unlawful conduct]
and
AE
02/03.01)
[discredit
to
the
Department] , and the sole remaining charge was
substantially less serious and was mitigated
by factors not previously considered or not
given proper weight by the Department (AE
02/02.02 C) [failure to notify].
R. 119 at 1 10. The Board's representation that the step 5 hearing
officer did not find that grievant had committed unlawful conduct
in violation of AE 02/03.37.A.5 is inaccurate.

See R. 22 at 1 8.

However, because the Board relied heavily on the step 5 decision as
the basis for its action at step 6, an examination of the step 5
decision is necessary to place that action in context.
A.

The Step 5 Decision
At step 5, the CSRB hearing officer "concluded that the

termination

of

Grievant's

employment

was

so

clearly

disproportionate to the factually supported misconduct, and so
discriminatory, based upon the lesser disciplinary sanctions meted
out by the Agency for more serious crimes by officers, that it
amounts to an abuse of discretion."
officer based

this

R. 24 at 1 20.

conclusion on several

factors:

The hearing
(1) the

Department's failure "to give sufficient weight to the mitigating
circumstances in this case, including Grievant's prior good work
history as evidenced by his satisfactory performance evaluations,
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and the stressful circumstances in which the events leading to the
disciplinary action occurred"
substantial

evidence

(R. 22 at 1 12); (2) a lack of

surrounding

unspecified

aggravating

circumstances found by the Department (see R. 23 at 1 13); (3) the
hearing officer's conclusion that grievant's criminal conduct
constituted only a class C misdemeanor, rather than the class B
misdemeanor to which grievant pleaded guilty (see R. 22 at 1 8 and
R. 23 at 1 14) ; and (4) the fact that the Department based its
sanction on grievant's guilt of three disciplinary infractions
rather than the two violations found at the step 5 level (see R. 23
at 1 14) . The hearing officer further based his conclusion on a
cursory review of other Department disciplinary documents contained
in grievant's exhibit no. 13 (Addendum I) , relying particularly on
case nos. 32 and 33 (see R. 23-24 at 11 15-19).

A review of the

record in this case shows the hearing officer's reliance on each of
these factors to be misplaced.
In

his

administrative

report

and

law

judge

recommendation,
extensively

the

reviewed

Department's
grievant's

performance evaluations. See R. 280-81. He noted that grievant's
performance was rated "standard" throughout the course of his
Department employment.

He also cited both positive and negative

comments contained in the evaluations.

See id.

The CSRB hearing

officer neither referred to the specifics discussed in the report
and recommendation

nor showed the administrative

law judge's

interpretations of them to be unreasonable. Therefore, the hearing
officer's conclusion that the Department failed to give sufficient
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weight to grievant's work record is entirely unsupported and
deserves no credence.
The

hearing

officer's

reliance

circumstances is likewise misplaced.

on

grievant's

stressful

Any stress related to the

criminal charge against grievant was of grievant's own making. To
excuse grievant from responsibility for his policy violations on
the basis of stress created by his voluntary criminal acts would be
to justify his misconduct. While the death of grievant's mother on
July 17, 1989 was unfortunate, the death of a close relative is not
an unusual or unexpected source of stress in ordinary life.
Moreover, it preceded the August 22, 1989 interview with Gwen
Rowley (see R. 512), during which grievant refused to advise his
supervisors of the criminal charge, by over a month and his
disrespectful

conduct

to the court at

the October

10, 1989

sentencing hearing (see R. 301) by nearly three months. To suggest
that he was still operating under the immediate influence of this
earlier stress contorts reality.
The only aggravating circumstance relied on by the Department
in reaching the termination decision was grievant's position as a
certified peace officer.

See R. 277 and 283.

The CSRB hearing

officer did not comment on or controvert grievant's peace officer
status and the high standard of conduct expected of law enforcement
personnel.

Therefore,

the hearing

officer's reliance on an

asserted lack of substantial evidence surrounding unenumerated
aggravating

circumstances

is totally unfounded and cannot be

sustained.
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As discussed above, the hearing officer did not address the
culpable mental state for a class B misdemeanor in determining that
grievant had committed conduct arising only to class C misdemeanor
status.

The lack of an articulated rationale for rejecting a

finding of class B conduct provides no ground for overturning the
Department's decision and casts the hearing officer's own finding
in doubt.
Because all three of the Department's charges against grievant
are supported by substantial evidence, the hearing officer erred in
predicating his determination of excessive sanctions on only two
policy violations.

As discussed at length above, the fact that

reasonable minds may differ in interpreting the evidence does not
permit the hearing officer to substitute his judgment for the
Department's sustainable findings in order to hold the Department's
choice of sanctions excessive.
conclusion

as

to

the

Because the hearing officer's

termination

sanction

was

erroneously

predicated on improper findings, it is invalid.
The hearing officer speaks in general terms about grievant's
exhibit no. 13 in finding grievant's termination excessive, but
specifically identifies only two cases as compelling. Because both
cases were decided in 1992 by an administration subsequent to the
one that decided grievant's case, they do not necessarily reflect
the disciplinary standards applied by the prior administration.
Case 33 is mentioned without analysis only as a recent case "that
can fairly be used to judge the consistency and logic of the
Agency's discipline of Grievant."
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R. 24 at 1 19.

However, the

final order in that case demonstrates substantial distinctions
between case no. 33 and the action against grievant.

The order

notes the employee's "consistently positive work performance" (R.
1478) as opposed to grievant's standard evaluations with mixed
positive and negative comments.
acceptance
cooperation

of

responsibility

with

the arrest

It further notes

for
and

his

actions,

adjudication

his

"his full
apparent

processes, his

openness about his alcohol-related problems, his active and ongoing
participation in counseling, and his consistent attendance at
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings." Id. These factors stand in stark
contrast to grievant#s consistent denial of responsibility for his
criminal conduct (see R. 303-04 and 307), his publicly expressed
disrespect for the sentencing court, his attempt to keep his public
conviction a private matter, and his expressed lack of confidence
in court-ordered counseling (see R. 305-06 and 309-10). Moreover,
the administrative law judge, in the case no. 33 report and
recommendation, found that the employee had reported his arrest and
adjudication as policy required, unlike grievant.

He also found

that the employee's actions, unlike grievant's, did not cause
injury.

Finally, the sanctions applied in case no. 33--a 30 day

suspension, a three-level demotion and commensurate pay reduction,
prohibition from a supervisory position for at least one year, an
unlimited bar on his operation of a state vehicle, and an extended
corrective action plan including frequent and regular progress
reports and documentation of continuing involvement in appropriate
therapy--are

substantially

more
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severe

than

the

single-level

reduction and 30 days' suspension the CSRB hearing officer found
appropriate for grievant.

The numerous distinctions between case

no. 33 and grievant's case defy the hearing officer's attempt to
use it as a lodestar.
Case no. 32 is similarly inapposite. The CSRB hearing officer
misrepresents the Department's decision in case no. 32 when he
states that "no disciplinary action other than an admonishment was
imposed on the officer, because, according to the order, no crime
was charged by the police or prosecutor." R. 23 at 1 15. In fact,
the Department's hearing examiner in case no. 32--a person other
than the administrative law judge who heard grievant's caseexpressly concluded that the employee's conduct did not reach a
level constituting a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109, the
same statute to which grievant pleaded guilty, and consequently the
employee, unlike grievant, could not be held to have violated the
Department's unlawful conduct policy.

As in grievant's case, the

Department focused on the employee's underlying behavior rather
than any legal charges stemming from it.
Department's

executive

director

not

to

The decision of the
impose

sanctions

was

explicitly founded on the absence of a policy violation, not the
absence of a criminal conviction. Noting that "in his conclusions
of law, Mr. Baksh concludes that [the employee] has violated no
policy or procedure" (R. 1471), the executive director stated,
"Because there has been no violation of policy, I cannot impose
discipline, warning or admonition."
administrative

charges

against
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the

Id.

This lack of sustained

employee

stands

in sharp

c
against

grievant

at the Department

level.

a '-

distinguishable from grievant

is;

f
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-
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Department's
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which f>
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expressly

re] i ec " . "

CSRB hearing officer

*
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Department
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The Step 6 Decision
At step 6, the Board sustained its hearing office:
r

findings that grievant(see J

iltimate

"inq discredi:

grievant did, in fact, commit a technical

violat

Is failure to report (see id,)

However,
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c

the Department's
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reasonably related
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decision
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grievant's case.

^t

22
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Both cases are distinguishable

from

It is significant that neither case cited by the
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Board deals with the kind of abusive behavior in which grievant
engaged.
Case no. 22 was decided in 1991 following issuance of a report
and recommendation by the Department's administrative law judge in
1990.

It involves a correctional officer who was found guilty of

violating Department policy by illegally killing a bear, for which
he faced class A misdemeanor charges.

Although termination was

within the range of sanctions recommended by the administrative law
judge, the Department retained the employee in case no. 22 under
the following conditions, only some of which were enumerated in the
Board's decision:

a 30-day suspension, a two-level reduction in

grade, a 10 percent reduction in salary, a one-year ineligibility
for promotion or merit increases, a two-year ineligibility for
supervisory positions at the employee's former grade level, a oneyear ineligibility for supervisory authority or an individual case
load, a one-year ineligibility

for positions

requiring peace

officer certification, a one-year prohibition on all participation
in

hunting

evaluation.

activities,

and

referral

for

fitness-for-duty

Under the terms of the order, any violation of the

order within one year would constitute grounds for termination.
See R. 1395.

In mitigation, the administrative law judge found a

lengthy 14-year employment record studded with numerous abovestandard and outstanding evaluations (see R. 1398)f in contrast to
grievant's short employment history and standard evaluations with
positive and negative comments. The employee was also "cooperative
during the investigation and candid regarding his conduct" (id.),
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Case

decided
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probationary
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resulted
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reckless driving.
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uniform

conduct
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i

mitigated by the fact that he was just coming off

c

appearance (see R, 1243) and that he wore

his uniform at the recommendation ol hin a" I m. rn."i

bee

. 1I "

After reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
Depar

ordered the employee suspended

without pay for

-

discretion n) i in Hmp.l ny^n s

division management; required the employee to send a letter of
*i I M i i iv l

i "Ill 11 up nil Ki>i until whom the employee had engaged in

a verbal altercation; and mandated the employee's i: ee «» aJ • is til on
before his probationary period expired, when his employment could
The final order also
reflects that at the time

case no,

experiencing a personnel crisis due

__

i, the Department was
JIII

"unacceptably

high

mortality rate of probationary employees" (R. 1238) and notes that
the correctional environment

"coupled with strong emphasis on

personal accountability makes it difficult even for new employees
with excellent potential to succeed."

R. 1239. The order further

notes the employee's full acceptance of the wrongfulness of his
actions. Id. None of these factors is present in grievant's case.
Like the hearing officer's step 5 conclusion, the Board's
conclusion that the termination sanction was unwarranted is a
direct

result

of

its

erroneous

findings.

The

Department's

administrative law judge stated that "[t]he most serious matter in
this case is the conviction for child abuse" (R. 278) based on its
adverse reflection on grievant's calling as an officer and the
doubt into which it cast his ability to perform his official
functions.

By erroneously holding, contrary to this Court's

Despain pronouncement,
conduct,

the

consideration.

Board

that grievant

removed

the most

did not

commit unlawful

serious violation

from

Moreover, it compounded the errors committed at

step 5 by reviewing only the improper £l£ novo findings of its
hearing

officer.

Had

the

Board

properly

viewed

grievant's

termination in the context of the three violations supported by
substantial record evidence, it could only have concluded that
grievant's termination was well within the bounds of reason and not
excessive, disproportionate,
discretion.

Because

or an abuse of the Department's

the Board's

conclusion has an

improper

foundation, its order for grievant's reinstatement and ancillary
relief must be overturned.
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CONCLUSION
The Career Service Review Board
powers

:ts exercise of power beyond

statutory jurisdiction

cam

i implement excessive

power does :.
The

justify its extrajurisdictional act ic us

Department

Corrections,

sta^

acting

pursuant

to

its

isciplined grievant for his

three

violations

Department

substantial evidence

policy

and

procedure

di i er

violations was adduced before the

Department's adit-

"tie Board may not avoid its

duty to affirm

:- Department's sustainable finding*

ny ' Jimur

ignoring them, as
Grievant,
constitutes

I

child

<

dinj ss i 01 >,
abuse

under

verturned

conduct

from

Department

Utah

mim f, t- oHi conduct:
.

T h e fact

that h i s

technicality does n o t remove h i s

t h e statutory

n o r t h e Board

the
h a s jurisdiction

i u apply

conduct, b o t h agencies h a v e a duty
that public employees
their e m p l o y e r s .

criminal
assure

.

of

T h e public deserves

Gri evgrit";"" "'"•! termination from employment
substantial evidence of
conduct.

that

^ amply supported b y
iirml n, unlawful

The Board's error in ordering his reinstatement must be

ihnil iticcJ i / reversal of the Board decision.
Foi the foregoing reasons, the Utah Depax
respectfully requests this Court to reverse
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3
decision

Career Service Review Board and to reinstate the Department's order
of termination•
Dated this

ZTWlx

day of July, 1994.
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